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IS AMENDMEN T 2 REALLY A BILL OF
AT TAINDER? SOME QUEST IONS ABOUT
PROFESSOR AMAR'S ANALYSIS OF ROMER
Roderick M. Hills, Jr.*

As I first discovered as a law student in Professor Amar's classes
on legal history and federal courts, it is generally an intellectual treat to
listen to Professor Amar's legal analysis, even when he is attacking
one's own arguments. So my pleasure at reading Professor Amar's anal
ysis of the Court's decision in Romer v. Evans was only partly damp
ened by his disapproval of the respondents' brief that I and other plain
tiffs ' counsel filed with the Court. According to Amar, this respondents'
brief provided the Court with "so little help" that it had to rely on an
entirely different and much sounder argument - an argument rooted in
the U.S. Constitution's prohibition on attainder,1 contained in Article I,
sections 9 and 10.
Amar maintains that (1) contrary to Justice Scalia's vituperative
dissent, the attainder argument provides an intellectually compelling ba
sis for believing that Amendment 2 is unconstitutional, and (2) the
Romer decision, correctly interpreted, adopted precisely this argument.

Amar's revival of the Attainder Clauses is classically Amaresque: it
talces constitutional text and structure seriously and it provides an origi
nal and sensitive reading of specific constitutional clauses and a careful
understanding of their structural relationships.
However, as much as I appreciate his elegant and astute reading of
the Attainder Clauses, I think in the end that his application of these
clauses to Amendment 2 and his reading of Romer are unconvincing.
The difficulty with his argument is that, as Amar notes, the Attainder
Clauses prohibit state and federal legislation from "naming persons and
singling them out for distinctive treatment."2 As explained below, a law
"names " persons only if it defines a closed class of persons with some
fixed characteristic - a class the entire membership of which could be
*

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1987, J.D. 1991, Yale.

Ed. The author was one of several attorneys who represented the plaintiff-respon
dents in Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
1. Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MICH.
L. REv. 203, 222 (1996).

-

2. Id. at 213 (emphasis added).
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known (at least in theory) by the legislators at the moment when the
law is enacted.
Amar provides no persuasive argument that the term "homosexual,
lesbian, or bisexual orientation" denotes such a closed class.To make
such an argument, he would have to show that sexual orientation is not
merely a status, but also an irreversible status, a characteristic that does
not change over time and that thereby defines a closed class from which
members cannot exit and nonmembers cannot enter. Rather than attempt
such an argument, Amar argues that Amendment 2 discriminates on the
basis of "status" rather than "conduct " and thus "targets persons for
who they are, not what they have done. "3 But this status-conduct dis
tinction is irrelevant to the issue raised by the Attainder Clauses - the
issue of whether Amendment 2 names persons by designating them as a
closed class, the entire membership of which could be known by the
legislature.
Amar's emphasis on the status-conduct decision is mischievous not
merely because it misconstrues the Attainder Clauses but also because
the distinction is, in a larger sense, deeply misguided: although the dis
tinction repeatedly surfaces in gay rights litigation,4 it is practically triv
ial and intellectually incoherent.Indeed, this is why neither the respon
dents' brief, nor Professor Tribe's amicus brief, nor- as I shall explain
below - the Romer Court relied on such a distinction. Amendment 2
would be a deprivation of equal protection - although not an attaint even if the term "orientation " were omitted from its text. For, as Romer
and respondent's brief repeatedly state (and as Amar curiously ignores),
the central flaw in Amendment 2 is not its ambiguous and probably
severable mention of "orientation" but rather its breadth, its imposition
of a "broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group,"5
3. Id. at 217.
4. See, e.g., Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 64-67 (D.C. Cir. 1993), revd. en bane,
Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that the Department of De
fense's regulations imputing persons on homosexual status, not conduct, were repugnant
to common law and constitutional principles); Watkins v. United States Army, 837 F.2d
1428, 1434-35, 1451, different result reached on rehg., 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en
bane), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 384 (1990) (holding that the Army's regulations, under
which "homosexuality" - not sexual conduct - was the operative trait for disqualifi
cation, were unconstitutional because they discriminated against persons of homosexual
orientation, a suspect class); Jantz v. Muci, 159 F. Supp. 1543, 1546-47, 1551 (D. Kan.
1991) revd., 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding that a governmental classification
based on an individual's sexual orientation is inherently suspect, while noting that most
courts have found that persons engaging in homosexual conduct do not constitute a sus
pect class). As these examples suggest, the status-conduct distinction has not fared well
as a way of vindicating gay rights: at best, it is accepted by lower courts or appellate
panels only to be rejected on appeal or en bane.
5. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996).
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regardless of whether the group is defined by conduct or orientation. It
is the sheer breadth of Amendment

2

that makes it constitutionally sus

pect, and not some burden on "orientation" as opposed to "conduct."

In the following pages, I will first attempt to explain the scope and
purposes underlying the Constitution's clauses forbidding bills of attain
der. Then I will show that the distinction between "orientation" and
"conduct" - or "status" and "conduct" - really has nothing whatso
ever to do with this principle. Finally, I will try to show that, like re
spondent's brief, Romer depends crucially on the breadth of Amend
ment

2

-

the

wide

category

of

antidiscrimination

laws

that

Amendment 2 preempted. It is this breadth, and not any use of the term
"orientation" that led the Court to invalidate Amendment 2.
I.
First, let me start where I think that Amar and I agree: What is at
tainder, and why is it suspicious?
As Amar notes, at the core of the rules against attainder is the no
tion that "[a] law naming persons and singling them out for distinctive
treatment is suspicious. "6 The fundamental principle underlying the rule
is that the state and federal legislatures must make policy by "generally
applicable rule[s]"7 rather than by laws that single out groups or per
sons by name

-

what the Court calls "specifically designated persons

or groups. "8 Thus, the most obvious violation of the rule against attain
der is a statute that literally designates individuals by their proper
names - for instance, a law stating, "Akhil Amar is barred from hold
ing public office." Amar is surely correct that the Attainder Clauses
would also bar the Congress from using definite descriptions for the
same purpose as a proper name: it would equally be unconstitutional for
Congress to declare that "all persons who wrote an article entitled Of

Sovereignty and Federalism will be barred from public office," for the
definite description obviously serves the purpose of singling out a spe
cific individual and no one else. Moreover, Amar must also be correct
that a law can be a bill of attainder if it designates a specific group of
persons: so, for instance, a law barring "all members of the Amar fam
ily" from holding public office would be an attainder just as much as if
each member of the family were individually listed in the text of the
statute.

6. Amar, supra note 1, at 213 (emphasis added).
7. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 450 (1965).
8. 381 U.S. at 447.
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From these uncontroversial propositions, Amar makes the in
sightful observation that the rule against attainder is actually "a proto
type of the Equal Protection Clause: "9 the rule limits the ability of the
legislature to single out disfavored groups and thereby prevents depriva
tion of equal legal protections. As Amar notes, a law barring "all per
sons of East Indian descent " from holding public office would be just
as much of an attainder as a law barring "the Amar family " from hold
ing public office. For such a law would "specifically designate[] "

a

group of persons and no one else for disfavored treatment just as much
as a law penalizing an entire family.10 Indeed, the analogy between ra
cial and familial classifications is extraordinarily close: both are legal
relationships defined by lineal descent, ancestry, or blood line.
But Amar's astute analogy between the rule against attainder and
the rule against deprivations of equal protection is not just an insight
but a warning: there is a danger that the concept of attainder can be
come just as murky and incoherent as concepts of equal protection,
bogged down in " 'free-form' constitutionalism " which Amar rightly
disparages but that has notoriously plagued equal protection law. The
problem is that, while the rule against attainder prohibits laws that im
pose punishment on "specifically designated persons or groups,"11 we
do not really have a clear notion of what it means to "specifically " des
ignate something or someone. Of course, proper names are the easiest
case.12 But, as we have seen, they are not the only sort of "specificity "
that the anti-attainder rule prohibits. Laws that burden "members of the
Communist Party " or "former rebels against the United States govern
ment " are also too "specific. " But then what exactly is not "too spe
cific "? What passes muster as a "generally applicable rule"? As Pro
fessor Tribe has noted, "the concept of legislative 'specification' . ..
cannot be so broad as to swallow up all laws that impose some disa
bling limitation upon an ascertainable group. "13 Could a law impose
regulatory burdens on "the catfood industry "? "Fly fishermen "? "Per
sons under six feet in height"?
Unfortunately, Amar does not provide a criterion for defining ille
gal legislative specification - illegal "naming " - beyond stating that
laws cannot "target[] persons for who they are " on the basis of their

9. Amar, supra note 1, at 215.
10. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 447.
11. 381 U.S. at 447.
12. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
13. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 10-4, at 644 (2d
ed. 1988).
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"status."14 This is a little vague: what does it mean exactly to target
persons "for who they are?" All laws, after all, distinguish between
persons based on their characteristics - frequently including character
istics like age and handicap that are involuntary, personal traits. And
these characteristics seem to be a part of what identifies persons as
"who they are."
I think that one can provide a more precise account of what it

means to "name" a person or group. The essence of such "naming" such illegal legislative specification - is that the legislation defines a
closed class, a class with a membership that is permanently fixed when
the class is defined, from which members can never exit and into which
nonmembers can never enter, as a matter of law. Logic, precedent, and
policy suggest that the Attainder Clauses forbid such closed classes and
nothing else.
Consider, first, the logic of proper names. The essence of naming
is to designate a unique person or group of persons to which anyone not
so designated can never belong. Unlike a general term, a name func
tions like a telephone number or address in that it designates one item
or set of items and no others, without attempting to say anything more
about the items.15 W hen I use the name "Akhil Amar," I intend to refer
to a specific person and to no one else (not even to other people who
might, by coincidence, have the same name). Likewise, ifl refer to "all
persons who aided the Confederacy during the Civil War," I name a
closed class of persons that can, by definition, never include another
member aside from the members denoted when the term is used.
Note that legal classifications defined by birth or parentage - le
gitimacy, alienage, or race - are a special type of closed class. As a
matter of law, one's race does not change, for the law generally defines
race by one's parentage: burdens on racially defined classes will, by
definition, never fall upon persons outside such classes because parent
age, like other past events, is unchangeable as a matter of law.16 But,
what is worse, racial classifications, being legally hereditary conditions,

14. Amar, supra note 1, at 217.
15. This assertion about names hides a great deal of semantic complexity, which is

explored by a field of philosophy sometimes termed "reference theory." In my argu
ment, I use the term "name" in roughly the same way that Saul Kripke uses the term
"rigid designator." For some seminal accounts of proper names and general terms, see
SAUL A. KRIPKE, NAMING AND N ECES SITY (1977) and HlLARY PuTNAM, The

Meaning of 'Meaning,' in 2 MIND, LANGUAGE, AND REALITY: PHILOSOPHICAL PA
PERS 215 (1975).
16. Note that this unchangeability has nothing to do with whether race is somehow

"immutable" in any biological sense: race is considered here only as a legal concept,
not a biological fact
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target not merely specific groups of presently existing individuals but
also specific groups of families and lines of familial descent. It is as if
the law contained a list of proper familial names rather than individual
names. Such a legal burden will be transmitted lineally from parent to
child, insuring that the descendants of the legislators' enemies. will be
burdened and the children of the legislators' friends will be exempt.
Thus, the prohibition against racial discrimination contained implicitly
in the Fourteenth Amendment, as Amar notes, has deep antecedents in
Article I's prohibitions ori attainder and titles of nobility and Article ill,
section

3's prohibition on corruption of blood.

Consider also judicial precedent. In determining whether the mem
bers of a legislative class are "easily ascertainable" and therefore ille
gally specified or "named," the Court asks whether the class's member
ship is irreversibly fixed on enactment or whether exit and entry into
the class is possible after the law's enactment. For instance, in Selective

Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group,17 the
Court held that a federal statute denying educational assistance to stu
dents who failed to register for the draft, did not attaint such students
because such students could escape the law's burdening simply by reg
istering in accordance with the law. By contrast, the Court noted that
the laws at issue in Cummings 18 and Garland, 19 barring former Con
federate sympathizers from being licensed for various professions, were
bills of attainder because they created "absolute barriers" to exit from
the class: "no one who had served the Confederacy could possibl[y]
comply [with the licensing requirement], for his status was irreversi

ble. "20 In short, the Attainder Clauses do not necessarily bar legal bur
dens based on status per se, but rather classifications based on "irre
versible" status - that is, on legally closed classifications with a
membership that is, therefore, permanently fixed upon enactment.
What policy might be served by such a rule against closed classes?
Amar provides us with the answer: closed classes tear away the "veil of
ignorance" that should normally accompany legislation and thus invite
corrupt legislative purposes to infect lawmaking.21 Closed classes pierce
this veil of ignorance by insuring that the legislators will know the
identities of everyone who will ever be burdened by legislation. By us
ing these closed classes, a legislator can ensure that a legislative burden
will be imposed only on persons that she dislikes and no one else -

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

468 U.S. 841 (1984).
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
468 U.S. at 850-51 (emphasis added).
See Amar, supra note 1, at 210.
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that the classification will never inadvertently "spill over," as it were,
on to political allies. Therefore, legislation containing closed classes en
ables legislatures to launch "surgical strikes" against unpopular groups,
confident that such burdens will not affect favored constituents upon
whom the legislator depends.22
But why require such a veil of ignorance at all? Why must the leg
islature be forced through the use of open classes to be minimally im
partial? There is a deep constitutional tradition that governmental deci
sions cannot rest on a mere desire to impose costs on one person or
group for the benefit of another person or group; the identity of the bur
dened persons ought to be irrelevant to the purpose of the burden.23
This tradition of minimal impartiality is enforced in some contexts,
such as adjudication, through institutional design. For instance, judges
have life tenure, are bound by precedent, and are conditioned to limit
their own discretion by various forms of professional indoctrination;
likewise, ex parte contacts are forbidden; reasons for decisions must be
provided on a record; evidence must be presented in a controlled set
ting; and so forth.

In the legislative context, however, these sorts of institutional con
straints are necessarily missing. The Attainder Clause's prohibition on
closed classes preserves a minimal degree of impartiality that is other
wise impossible to guarantee in the legislative context through institu
tional design. The veil of ignorance in the legislative chambers, in ef
fect, replaces the blindfold on the face of Justice in the courtroom, and
creates a different sort of blindness that accomplishes the same sort of
effect - a minimal degree of impartiality.

II.
In light of this summary of Attainder Clause jurisprudence, it is
easy to see why Amar's argument against Amendment

2 based on the

Attainder Clause faces some serious obstacles. Quite simply, it is at

22. Note that open classes preserve the veil of ignorance in that, at least in theory,
the legislator using such classes can never predict whether or not she or her favored
constituents will end up being burdened by the law: legislators who vote for a law re
quiring the imprisonment of "embezzlers" or the constituents who support such legisla
tors cannot know for sure whether they themselves might not some day end up being
indicted under the law. (Impossible? Ask Dan Rostenkowski.) The membership of the
class "embezzlers" is not logically fixed by a finite number of names of individuals or
family lines when it is enacted into law. Thus, if legislators are forced to forego closed
classes, they will have an incentive to moderate their partiality toward themselves and
their particular constituent coalition .
23. For a general discussion of this tradition, see CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION 17-39 (1993).
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2 - persons with

"homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices, or re
lationships " - is a closed class that pierces the legislative veil of
ignorance.
Amar emphasizes that Amendment

2 specifically does not cover

persons of heterosexual orientation.24 This is true, but, depending on
how homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation is defined, it is irrele
vant. For it might be the case that the phrase "homosexual orientation "
refers to an inclination, desire, urge, and so on, that anyone in Colorado
can have or cease to have at any time, much like a desire to hunt elk,
drive red sports cars, smoke, eat junk food, forge checks, cheat on one's
spouse, or marry more than one person. That is, "being a gay person "
might be like "being a pedestrian" - something that each person be
comes some of the time but that no one is all of the time. If homosex
ual orientation designates a mutable mental state that might potentially
affect any and all persons from time to time - analogous to "adulter
ous orientation " or "polygamous orientation" - then the membership
of the class covered by Amendment

2 was not fixed when the law was
2 themselves could be

enacted. In theory, the proponents of Amendment
burdened by Amendment

2, if and when they experienced homosexual

orientation.
Perhaps sensing that his interpretation of the term "orientation " in
Amendment

2 is tendentious, Amar offers some occasional statements

of empirical fact about the nature of sexual orientation. He asserts that
"desires, fantasies, thoughts, urges, and drives" are "often " impossible
to "prevent or control, "25 and he asserts that "we are not all equally
likely tomorrow to wake up and feel gay. "26 At least the second of
these statements27 seems to suggest that "homosexual orientation " must
denote a closed class; Amar seems to be asserting that, as an empirical
matter, one subset of the population has a gay or lesbian orientation and
the rest of the population does not. Thus, like the class of persons with
blood type A or left-handedness,28 homosexual orientation denotes a

24. See Amar, supra note 1, at 207.
25. Id. at 218.
26. Id. at 234.
27. It is important to see that these statements make very different claims. The
first statement is irrelevant to whether Amendment 2 contains a closed class, for it as
serts only that homosexual orientation is involuntary. Perhaps it is. But if all persons are
equally prone to involuntary feelings of same-sex attraction, then the involuntary nature
of sexual orientation would not suggest that Amendment 2 creates any closed class. We
are all prone to involuntary aging, but age classifications are not closed, for their mem
bership shifts constantly.
28. See Amar, supra note 1, at 226.
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class smaller than the entire population of Colorado, the membership of
which is fixed when Amendment 2 was enacted.
One can concede the obvious: not all persons are equally likely to
have a desire to engage in "homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual . . . con
duct, practices, or relationships. "29 But this empirical fact cannot con
vert Amendment 2's reference to "orientation" into a closed class: not
all of us are likely to wake up in the morning wanting to be investment
bankers or to evade the draft. Nevertheless, laws burdening "investment
bankers" or "draft evaders" do not thereby become attaints on the bur
dened persons. The issue is whether Amendment 2 contains a term that
functions as a proper name - a term denoting some characteristic that,
by definition, only an identified subset of the population can potentially
possess.
If one looks to the intent of a law's proponents to discern whether
a term in a law designates specific groups or persons with a closed
class, then it is not obvious that Amendment 2 contains a closed class.
Judging from the statements of the proponents of Amendment 2, the
term "homosexual orientation" was not intended to serve as a closed
class. Rather, Colorado for Family Values and the State of Colorado
both repeatedly asserted that homosexual orientation was a fluid rather
than an immutable characteristic: "gay persons" could lose it30 and
there was always the danger that heterosexuals could be seduced into
deserting their spouses and becoming gay or lesbian by the example of
openly homosexual conduct. That was, indeed, why they so feared "gay
rights:" the State argued that such rights would encourage more people
to "become gay."31
Note that this legislative intent distinguishes homosexual orienta
tion from, say, racial classifications. Racial classifications are under
stood by legislators who enact them to be legally hereditary characteris
tics fixed at birth and unchanging thereafter as a matter of law. By
contrast, the ratifiers of Amendment 2 apparently regarded the category

29. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623 (citing COLO. CONST. art.
· II, § 30(b)).
30. See, e.g., Affidavit of Charles W. Socarides, M.D., Evans v. Romer, Civ. A.
No. 92 CV 7223, 1993 WL 518586 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Dec. 14, 1993) (order granting pre
liminary injunction) (expert testimony regarding the possibility of ridding individuals of
homosexual inclination through psychiatric treatment); Testimony of James Nicolosi,
Evans, 1993 WL 518586 (preliminary injunction hearing) (expert testimony regarding
the success in ridding formerly homosexual persons of homosexual desire through
counseling); COLORADO FOR FAMILY VALUES, VOTE YES ON AMENDMENT 21
(1992) (pamphlet urging passage of amendment 2).
31. See Petitioners' Opening Brief at 40 n.59, Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335
(Colo. 1994) (Nos. 945A48, 945A128) (arguing that Amendment 2 is necessary to pre
serve heterosexual marriages from the "specter of sexual competition" presented by the
possibility of homosexual relationships).
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of "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual persons " as more like the category
of alcoholics or habitual smokers: anyone could fall into, or be re
deemed out of, the class.
Given the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, one easily might
regard this view of Amendment 2's proponents as empirically ground
less.32 However, if bills of attainder are forbidden because they target
specific persons, then one arguably should look to the intentions of the
ratifiers of Amendment 2 and not some empirical fact about sexual ori
entation to determine whether Amendment 2 illegally names any spe
cific group. If the ratifiers of Amendment 2 believed that anyone - in
cluding themselves - could become gay or lesbian, then such a belief
might suggest that they did not have any improper purpose to target a
discrete subpart of the population.33

In any case, even if one resolved the issue by·reference to empiri
cal evidence concerning human sexuality, it is not obvious that sexual
orientation is a fixed trait like, for example, blood type. Quite apart
from the proponents of Amendment 2, many advocates of gay and les
bian rights maintain that human sexual desire is more fluid than immu
table.34 Moreover, the trial court in Romer had been equivocal on the is-

32. For the official positions of the American Psychological Association and the
American Psychiatric Association concerning the origins of sexual orientation, see
FACT SHEET: GAY AND LESBIAN ISSUES, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION
(1993) and Proceedings of the American Psychological Association, Inc., for the Year
1974, 30 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 620, 633 (1975). For summaries of the literature sug
gesting that sexual orientation is generally established at an early age and is highly re
sistant to change, see RICHARD GREEN, SEXUAL SCIENCE AND THE LAW 62-86
(1992) and Judd Mannor, Overview: The Multiple Roots of Homosexual Behavior, in
HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR: A MODERN REAPPRAISAL 3 (Judd Mannor ed., 1980).
Examples of literature suggesting a physiological or genetic root to sexual orientation
include Dean Hamer et al., A Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome
and Male Sexual Orientation, 261 SCIENCE 321 (July 16, 1993) and Simon LeVay, A
Difference in Hypothalamic Structure Between Heterosexual and Homosexual Men, 253
SCIENCE 1034 (1991). Drs. Green, Hamer, and Mannor all testified at trial as expert
witnesses for the plaintiffs in the Romer case.
33. It is a debatable question whether the ratifiers actually had such a belief: de
spite their assertions that sexual orientation was mutable, the proponents of Amendment
2 may well have believed that persons with heterosexual inclinations could never have
homosexual inclinations. However, to establish.that the phrase "homosexual
orien
tation" contained in Amendment 2 constituted a closed class, one would have to ana
lyze what Amendment 2's proponents and ratifiers meant by this phrase. Such analysis
would require some discussion of the assumptions, values, and purposes of Amendment
2's proponents and ratifiers
their understanding of sexuality. Amar attempts no such
analysis; in this respect, his argument based on the Attainder Clauses is seriously
incomplete.
34. See, e.g., John D'Emilio, Capitalism and Gay Identity, in POWERS OF DE
SIRE: THE PoLmcs OF SEXUALITY 100, 109 (Ann Snitnow et al. eds., 1983)
("Claims made by gays and nongays that sexual orientation is fixed at an early age, that
.

-

•

•
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sue: after listening to hours of testimony, the court refused to make
findings on the causation or persistence of sexual orientation.35
One central weakness of Amar's argument based on attaint is that
he ignores such difficulties with the conclusory assertion that Amend
ment 2 burdens persons "for who they are." Amendment 2 "attaints"
persons only if the ratifiers of Amendment 2 knew the identity of all
persons burdened by Amendment 2. But Colorado voters could have
such knowledge only if the "status" of homosexual orientation were
"irreversible,"36 such that it defined a group with fixed and unchanging
membership. Amar offers no reason to believe that the phrase "homo
sexual . . . orientation," contained in Amendment 2 pierces the veil of
legislative ignorance by denoting such a group.
Instead, Amar relies on a different theory to explain how Amend
ment 2 is an attaint: he invokes the distinction between "status" and
"conduct." According to Amar, the Attainder Clauses forbid distinc
tions based on status while allowing distinctions based on conduct.
Thus, a racial classification that burdens racial groups constitutes an il
legal attainder because race is a sort of status rather than a sort of con
duct: "[a racial classification] targets specific persons for who they are
- it penalizes them for their status, not their conduct. "37 Likewise,
laws depriving persons of protection from discrimination on the basis of
gay or lesbian "orientation" also are attaints because they burden per
sons based on their propensities or inclinations - again, a type of sta
tus - and, therefore, "target[] persons for who they are, not for what
they have done. "38
There are, however, two problems with using the status-conduct
distinction to explain the scope of the Attainder Clauses. First, the dis
tinction between status and conduct is simply irrelevant to the Attainder
Clauses' meaning. Second, if Amar considers desires and propensities
to be a sort of "status," then the distinction between status and conduct
is simply a normatively implausible line to draw.

large numbers of visible gay men and lesbians in society, the media, and the schools,
will have no influence on the sexual identity of the young, are wrong."); Janet E. Hal
ley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from
Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REv. 503, 529-46 (1994).
35. See Evans v. Romer, Civ. A. No. 92 CV 7223, 1993 WL 518586, at 11 (Colo.
Dist Ct Dec. 14, 1993), affd., 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), affd., 116 S. Ct. 1620
(1996).
36. Cf. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S.
841, 851 (1984).
37. Amar, supra note 1, at 215; see id. at 223.
38. Id. at 217.
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Amar

Consider the meaning of the Attainder Clauses. The status-conduct
distinction is simply irrelevant to these clauses' prohibition on the legis
lative specification of persons by name: the clauses forbid conduct
based distinctions that specifically designate persons or groups, and
they permit status-based distinctions that do not specifically designate
persons or groups. So, for instance, even conduct-based distinctions are
forbidden when they designate specific persons based on those persons'

past conduct such as their support for the Confederacy during the Civil
War39 or for their joining the Communist Party of the United States.40
Likewise, status-based distinctions are not attaints if they do not desig
nate any closed class with an easily ascertainable membership. For in
stance, although age is a sort of "status" or personal trait, age-based
classifications are not attaints because the membership of age-based
classes continually changes.41
Much of Amar's reliance on the status-conduct distinction seems to
be rooted in a concern that government not criminalize mental states or
propensities alone, a concern that Amar finds reflected in Robinson v.

California42 and the "bedrock tenet" that "punishment can occur only
after offending conduct: it cannot be a crime simply to be, or merely to

think or feel. "43 But Robinson is a precedent interpreting the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments," not Ar
ticle I's prohibition on attainder. Unless the concept of attaints is coter
minous with the concept of "cruel and unusual punishments," this ar
gument is a non sequitur.
Put more generally, however cruel and unusual it might be to pun
ish people based on their thoughts alone, why would one think that the
Attainder Clauses address this particular evil? So long as the govern
ment metes out such punishment impartially,

without specifically

designating groups or persons by name or the equivalent, there is no at
taint - that is, no piercing of the legislative veil of ignorance. If homo
sexuality is an inclination to which any person is prone - as the propo
nents of Amendment
Amendment

2

2

seemed to maintain - then the cruelty of

is an impartial cruelty that does not violate Article I's at

tainder clauses.
Moreover, why should one assume that the government cannot dis
courage inclinations through civil burdens just because the Eighth

39. See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866); Cummings
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
40. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
41. Amar admits this point. See Amar, supra note 1, at 233.
42. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
43. Amar, supr a note 1, at 218.
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Amendment prohibits the government from criminalizing them? It is
commonplace for Anglo-American law to place obstacles in the way of
criminal prosecutions (grand jury indictment and extraordinary burdens
of proof, for example) that it waives for even punitive civil proceedings
(civil forfeiture, for example). Why is Robinson v. California's require
ment of an actus reus not precisely such an obstacle? While Robinson
forbids the government from criminalizing drug addiction, it certainly
does not bar the state from, say, refusing to hire drug addicts to drive
subway trains.44 It might be the case that the King cannot

try

me for

treason if I privately wish him to drop dead, but surely the King can re
fuse to hire me as a bodyguard if he discovers through reading my diary
that I harbor such a sentiment - even if such refusal has the purpose
and effect of stigmatizing assassins for their murderous thoughts.
Aside from the formal objection that a status-conduct distinction
seems to have nothing whatsoever to do with the Attainder Clauses,
there is the further practical objection that the distinction seems norma
tively groundless - indeed, trivial. Propensities are closely related to
intentional conduct: if one wants to affect intentional conduct, then one
generally tries to affect propensities. And one way that the government
uses to change propensities is to stigmatize them. As Judge Silberman
explained in the recent Steffan45 en bane opinion for the D.C. Circuit, if
the state legitimately may proscribe same-sex sexual contact as immoral
or antisocial or otherwise undesirable, it is not obvious why the govern
ment cannot also take measures to stigmatize propensities that tend to
lead to the undesirable conduct. 46
Thus, the law routinely imposes stigmatic burdens on persons
based on their "character" - another term for propensity. Innumerable
state statutes, for instance, require that applicants for occupational li
censes for virtually every licensed occupation prove that they have
"good moral character."47 And, like any other employer, the govern
ment cares deeply about the propensities of its prospective employees.

44. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592-93 (1979). Of
course, one might argue that such status-based discrimination might survive strict scru
tiny. But why should it have to undergo such scrutiny in the first place? Neither text nor
precedent suggests that the Eighth Amendment even presumptively prohibits the gov
ernment from considering persons' temperament or inclinations - their "status" - in
drawing distinctions in civil contexts like public employment.
45. Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en bane).
46. See 41 F.3d at 685-90.
47. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-5-116.2(c) (1991) (law student intern must
have "good moral character"); COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-7-102(2)(c) (1991) (bail bonds
man must show that he is a person of "good moral character"); COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 12-9-107(21) (1991) (caller or assistant at bingo parlor must be "of good moral char
acter"); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 12-39-106(1) (1991) (applicant for license as nursing
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For instance, the faculty at any public law school would be predictably
interested in the temperament, predilections, and general character of
any candidate for a teaching position. If such a candidate sincerely an
nounced that she hated to write law review articles, then this revelation
of her propensities would surely count against her - regardless of her
otherwise stellar prior conduct.
This is not to deny that it might be more precise for the laws to
operate on the basis of specifically described conduct rather than status.
So, for instance, if a state were to adopt an employment policy docking
the pay of public employees who are "smokers " and requiring them to
attend seminars on the dangers of tobacco, one might reasonably com
plain that the state should instead dock the pay and impose the classes
on "people who routinely smoke " - that is, to burden some pattern Qf
smoking "conduct " rather than the "status " of being a smoker. But this
is surely a distinction without much normative significance because the
status of being a smoker manifests itself solely through visible behavior
like smoking: the status is just a shorthand for the conduct.
If the Attainder Clauses simply require that the government ex

press "status " terms ( "smoker " or "gay person") as "conduct " terms
( "person who regularly smokes " or "person who regularly engages in
homosexual conduct, relationships, or practices "), then the clauses are
unusually trivial in their effects. Under this view of the attainder provi
sions, Colorado could save Amendment 2 simply by dropping the term
"orientation, " or construing it to mean "manifest orientation, " and con
tinue to forbid the state from providing protection from discrimination
on the basis of "homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual conduct, practices, or
relationships." It is difficult to see why this would accomplish anything
of significance, however, especially given that the Colorado Supreme
Court construed the terms "orientation" and "conduct " to "provide[]
nothing more than a different way of identifying the same class of
persons. "48
At bottom, it is the triviality of the status-conduct distinction that
is the strongest objection to the distinction's continuing use in litigation
and debate over the rights of gays and lesbians. For gays and lesbians
are not interested in merely "being gay " (whatever that means): they
are interested in engaging in conduct: making love, forming relation
ships, dating, displaying photos of partners in the workplace, wearing
wedding rings, living together in rental units, holding hands in public,
home administrator must "submit evidence of good moral character"); CoLO. REv.
STAT. § 12-61-103(3) (1991) (real estate broker must have "good moral character").
48. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1349-50 (Colo. 1994), affd., 116 S. Ct 1620
(1996).
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and otheiwise expressing desire, affection, and commitment. Likewise,
the proponents of Amendment 2 and other opponents of what they term
"the gay life-style" are not simply interested in persecuting persons for
their inner thoughts and desires; they are interested in suppressing any
public manifestations of homosexuality through public and private ac
tion. To bar the state from burdening gay or lesbian "orientation" while
allowing the state to burden gay or lesbian "conduct, practices, and re
lationships" is to accomplish nothing of practical significance: it is to
give gay and lesbian persons the right to stay silent in the closet - a
"right" they already have, as a practical matter.

·

III.
In sum, neither the Attainder Clauses nor the status-conduct dis
tinction justify the holding of the Romer Court. Indeed, throughout the
entire text of the Romer opinion, there is not a single mention of the
distinction between status and conduct. Is there a better argument
against the constitutionality of Amendment 2?
I believe that there is, based not on the target of the law but the

breadth of the law. Moreover, I believe that this is the argument upon
which the Romer Court actually relied. Amendment 2 is such a sweep
ing burden that one can attribute to it only a purpose of inflicting harm
for harm's sake, of gratuitously branding persons with a status of
inferiority.
First, consider the language of Romer. The Court's opinion is fo
cused intensely on the breadth of the measure - Amendment 2's
"[s]weeping and comprehensive" removal of legal protections. 49 Ac
cording to the Court, Amendment 2 "impos[es] a broad and undifferen

tiated disability on a single named group" and "its sheer breadth is so
discontinuous with the [legitimate] reasons offered for it" that it must
violate equal protection principles.o
s While other laws have burdened
persons, the Court distinguishes such cases by noting that the laws in
such cases "were narrow enough in scope and grounded in a sufficient
factual context" to serve a legitimate purpose. s1 By contrast, Amend
ment 2 is unconstitutional because, after identifying persons by a single
trait, it "denies them protection across the board," by "declaring that

in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens . . . to seek
aid from the government. "S2 The Romer Court concludes that:

49.
50.
51.
52.

Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1625.

116 S. Ct. at 1627 (emphasis added).
116 S. Ct. at 1627 (emphasis added).
116 S. Ct. at 1628 (emphasis added).
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announcement that gays

particular protections from the law, in

flicts on them immediate, continuing, and real injuries that outrun and
belie any legitimate justifications that may be claimed for it. . . . The

breadth of [Amendment 2]

is so far removed from ... particular [legiti

mate] justifications that we find it impossible to credit them.53

In other words, the breadth of the disabilities imposed by Amendment 2
is at the core of the Court's opinion.
Amar's analysis based on the concept of attaint ignores this p"erva
sive language concerning Amendment 2's breadth, for the narrowest at
taint is still unconstitutional. A law barring "Akhil Amar" from hold
ing the post of town dog catcher would still violate the Attainder
Clauses. Under Amar's analysis, the breadth of Amendment 2 is simply
irrelevant, but it was obviously crucial to the Romer Court's analysis.
Contrary to Amar, I think that the Court's discussion of "status
based enactment" is best understood as referring not to Amendment 2's
reference to "orientation" but rather to this extraordinary breadth.
Amendment 2 was a status-based enactment because the disabilities im
posed by it were so broad that they can only be understood as an effort
to impose "disfavored legal status." Indeed, the Court uses the terms
"disfavored legal status'' and "general hardships" interchangeably
when it states that "laws singling out a certain class of citizens for dis
favored legal status or general hardships are rare."54 In short, Romer is
centrally concerned with Amendment 2's "indiscriminate imposition of
inequalities,"55 and not its imposition of burdens based on sexual orien
tation as opposed to conduct.
Why might the breadth of Amendment 2 render it unconstitu
tional? Amendment 2 was a rather extraordinary law - "unprece
dented," in the Court's phrase. To paraphrase Amendment 2's text:
neither the state of Colorado nor any of its departments or subdivisions
can create any law or policy "whereby homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual
orientation, conduct, relationships, or practices shall constitute or other
wise be the basis of . . . any claim of discrimination."56 It was undis
puted by the State of Colorado that this amendment barred state and lo
cal policies and rules that specifically protected gay and lesbian persons
even from discrimination by state actors or by otherwise pervasively
regulated persons - for example, lawyers, utilities, insurers. So, for in-

53. 116 S. Ct. at 1628-29 (emphasis added).
54. 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (emphasis added).
55. 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950) (quot
ing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948))).
56. COLO. CONST., art. II, § 30(b).
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stance, there was no dispute that Amendment 2 preempted a one
sentence executive order promulgated by Governor Romer forbidding
discrimination against state employees on the basis of their sexual
orientation.
Therefore, at the very least, Amendment

2 must have barred state

and local governments from promulgating policies or regulations ex
pressly declaring that sexual orientation is a forbidden ground for draw
ing distinctions, even when discrimination on the basis of sexual orien

tation really would. be arbitrary and illegal discrimination under state
law. One can assume, with the Romer Court and Justice Scalia's dissent,
that Amendment 2 would not have barred the state from enforcing a
general policy against "arbitrary" governmental discrimination by for
bidding specific acts of discrimination based on gay or lesbian sexual
orientation where such acts were, in fact, "arbitrary" under state law.
But Amendment 2 must have meant that, if some subdivision or branch
of the government wished specifically to declare in a general rule, regu
lation, or policy that discrimination specifically on the basis of sexual
orientation were arbitrary in some specific context, such a declaration
of policy would be forbidden by Amendment

2

-

even where such dis

crimination would, in fact, be arbitrary.
So, for instance, suppose that state law forbids police officers from
generally acting arbitrarily in the execution of their duties. If the police
chief of Denver were to issue a written "policy" stating that police of
ficers could not refuse to provide back-up assistance to lesbian and gay
police officers on the basis of their sexual orientation, then Amendment

·

2 would have barred that promulgation of such a policy. This is not to
say that Amendment 2 would have prevented the police chief from or
dering a specific officer to quit harassing gay and lesbian fellow of
ficers, but, like the Governor of Colorado, the police chief could not ex
pressly declare to the entire force in a general rule that discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation was, in fact, arbitrary.57
What could possibly be the legitimate purpose of such a limit on
the state's rulemaking capacity? To encourage police officers, govern-

57. Lest one argue that this construction of Amendment 2 is tendentious, keep in
mind that, according to the Colorado Supreme Court, the voter education pamphlet, the
proponents of Amendment 2, and the state of Colorado, Amendment 2 would have
overruled the Governor's Executive Order forbidding discrimination against state em
ployees on the basis of sexual orientation. State employees are covered by the state's
general rules against arbitrary discrimination: they can be fired only for just cause. If
Amendment 2 trumped the Governor's executive order, then mutatis mutandis it
trumped any policy that would make specific any general prohibition against arbitrary
discrimination by declaring that discrimination against gay and lesbian persons is, in
fact, arbitrary.
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ment supervisors, or building inspectors to violate state law? To keep
gay and lesbian persons ignorant of the state-law rights that the state
admits gay and lesbian persons retain? If discrimination against gay and
lesbian persons is really illegal under state law - because it is deemed
to be arbitrary state action by the state civil service commission, for in
stance - then surely the state ought to be able to say so.
It seems to me that the Romer Court simply held that such a blan
ket prohibition on protective policies can only be motivated by animos
ity toward the persons stripped of protection and not any legitimate
governmental purpose. Remember the minimal duty of impartiality: no
law can impose burdens on persons based solely on those persons'
identity - on the fact that the burden of a law is felt by A rather than
B. Put another way, a legislative classification must do more than de
fine the group that is burdened: it must also justify the burden imposed.
The breadth of Amendment 2's burdens defies justification except
as an expression of generalized hostility toward gay and lesbian per
sons. By the State's own admission, discrimination on the basis of ho
mosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation or conduct might be arbitrary
some of the time. Amendment 2, however, inexplicably precluded rules
and policies that specifically remedies such discrimination all of the
time - even in contexts where sexual orientation was completely irrel
evant to the State's own legitimate interests.
Perhaps such a broad exclusion of rules and policies might have
been justified as a prophylactic rule if there were some indication that a
narrower policy might not accomplish the aims of the State. But the
State never offered the Court any such prophylactic justification for
why Amendment 2 should paint :with such a broad brush, and it is hard
to imagine such a rationale. As the Romer Court noted, the remarkable
aspect of Amendment 2 was its imposition of "general hardships" on
persons. Whether those persons are defined by conduct or status, impo
sition of such "undifferentiated" disabilities "is not within our constitu
tional tradition": such "indiscriminate imposition of inequalities"58
seems so gratuitous that it can only be explained as "a classification of
persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection
Clause does not permit. "59
Such a theory of Romer based on the breadth of Amendment 2's
burdens requires more explanation than· space permits in this forum. In
particular, it requires one to answer Justice Scalia's charge that, under
Salerno, one cannot strike down Amendment 2 based on its unconstitu-

58. Romer, 116 S. Ct at 1628.
59. 116 S. Ct at 1628.
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tional breadth in the context of a facial challenge.60 However, such a
breadth-based theory better explains both the Romer Court's decision
and the unconstitutionality of Amendment 2 than the theory proposed
by Professor Amar based on the Attainder Clauses. And, incidentally, it
is precisely such a "rational basis" based on the breadth of Amendment
2's burdens that plaintiff-respondents pressed in their brief filed with
the Court.

60. See 116 S. Ct. at 1632.

